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Nowadays the security of cryptographic circuits is threatened not only by attacks on the algorithm, but also 
by attacks on the circuit implementation. They are the so-called side channel attacks and within such attacks 
are the Active Fault Analysis attacks. In literature, there are reported some vulnerability analysis of the 
Trivium stream cipher against Active Fault Analysis attacks using Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) [1][2]. 
The DFA technique is a side channel attack in which an attacker is able to inject a fault into the encryption or 
decryption process, thus retrieving the secret information. For the Trivium cypher, a fault is injected into the 
inner state. These works shown that if an attacker is able to inject only one fault in the inner state of the 
Trivium, the key could be retrieved, but none of them checks its feasibility on a specific hardware 
implementation. In this paper, it is presented an experimental analysis about the behaviour of FPGA 
implementations of Trivium ciphers against fault injection through the variation of the clock signal. In 
addition, it is made a comparative analysis between the experimental results obtained after the attack, and the 
expected results obtained by the simulation and timing analysis, that is, the fault positions of the Trivium inner 
state obtained experimentally and the fault positions expected by the timing analysis. This analysis was 
presented in [3] and results show the vulnerabilities of these implementations and the impossibility of 
determining the fault injections through simulation. 
In order to achieve the fault injection over the Trivium stream cipher, it has been designed a system that 
generate a short pulse in the clock signal. This system was presented in [4]. Since in order to generate a short 
pulse in the clock signal it is necessary to know the maximum frequency at which the cipher implementation 
was able to work. The specific characteristics of the FPGA implementations had to be taken into account. On 
one hand, the FPGA uses dedicated lines for clocks, guaranteeing low delay and very low skew in the clock 
signals. On the other hand, the structure of the Trivium is very simple, its implementations are very fast, and 
work at very high frequencies. In our tests, the Trivium stream ciphers work at the maximum frequency 
supported by the FPGA. So the system to be developed has three main points: a) Frequencies well above the 
maximum cannot be used, because they are filtered by the FPGA. b) Although to insert a fault in the Trivium 
it is necessary a frequency slightly above the maximum using a short pulse in the clock line, the whole control 
system and measurement must operate at a frequency much lower than the maximum. c) It must be ensured 
that the faults are being introduced in the Trivium and it does not have any errors in the rest of the system. 
To generate the short pulse on the clock signal, Digital Clock Manager (DCM) available in Xilinx FPGA 
devices are used. The DCM are specific modules that can generate clocks with different frequencies from an 
input clock. In the developed system, it has been generated a clock for the whole system and the Trivium with 
an optimal frequency, and another clock whose frequency is above the maximum frequency of the device. 
Considering that the maximum frequency of the Spartan 3E XC3S500E device is 311 MHz, a clock of 316.66 
MHz has been generated because was tested that the Trivium fails at this frequency. It has been carried out 
several tests to verify that the clock signal of 316.66 MHz is being generated correctly. Switching between the 
two clock signals is done using a clock signal multiplexer, which allows switching between two clock signals 
without generating additional pulses. 
To analyze routing dependency and behavior against the same attack, three copies of the Trivium cipher 
were implemented in the device in parallel mode. The short pulse was injected in two of them while the third 
was remained fault-free. In other words, there were two ciphers with fault injection and another that worked 
properly. The fault-free inner state of the third Trivium was compared with the inner states of the other two 
Triviums in order to detect the fault injections. To analyze the repeatability of the fault injection, 
approximately 1600 tests were carried out and four random pair of key and IV have been used. On the other 
hand, a fault injection would be considered effective or successful when a fault was injected into any of the 
ciphers three shift registers and this injection comprised only one wrong bit. In cases where the fault injections 
produced more than one wrong bit, the injection in question would be considered as an unsuccessful attack. 
Table I shows the number of faults injected for each pair key-IV in the four different clock cycles. When the 
number of faults is one, it means that for these conditions it has been injected only one wrong bit in the shift 
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register and therefore the fault is effective. When the number of faults is zero means that we have not injected 
faults, instead, non effective faults are considered when the number of injected faults is bigger than one. 
Table II and Table III show the positions of the faulty bits in the inner state for the same tests shown in 
Table I in the cases of key 1 IV 1 and key 2 IV 1. These results show that for the same case, the position of the 
fault injection can change under the same conditions, being type 1 or type 2. Even though the bits that tend to 
fail oscillate around the same positions, they change their number and position for the same cipher, the same 
pair key-IV and different insertion cycle. Regarding the bits position, it is found that the bits that tend to fail 
are near the bits used by the Trivium for feedback or for logic operations. 
Finally, with the aim of designing an implementation capable of resisting the attacks presented, an analysis 
was made of delays in the bits that failed with the post-route data. The flip-flops that failed were expected to 
be those with the greatest delays in their input paths. Using timing restrictions on those paths would therefore 
reduce their vulnerability. The timing analysis with the post-route data was carried out using both static 
analysis tools and post-route timing simulation. Experimental results presented were compared with the 
results expected from the timing analysis of the implemented circuit presented in [3]. These results show that 
pre-implementation analyses are not valid when designing a robust implementation resistant to fault injections 
involving the insertion of a pulse in the clock line. The only valid analysis capable of determining the 
vulnerabilities of Trivium ciphers implemented on FPGA is therefore to subject the system to fault injection 
and identify its weakest points in experimental mode. 
 
TABLE I. FAULT INJECTIONS ON THE CIPHERS FOR EACH KEY/IV PAIR AND INSERTION CYCLE. 
 
 
 
 
 
                TABLE II. POSITIONS OF THE FAULTS TYPE 1 AND                                 TABLE III. POSITIONS OF THE FAULTS TYPE 1 AND 
                              TYPE 2 ON EACH CIPHER FOR KEY 1 IV 1.                   TYPE 2 ON EACH CIPHER FOR KEY 2 IV 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From all results, it can be insured that the designed system is able to inject only one fault in the inner state 
of the Trivium with an efficiency of 91.34%, demonstrating the vulnerability of the Trivium against 
Differential Fault Analysis attacks. Furthermore, it has been seen that the bits that tend to fail are those bits 
used to do the logical operations of the cipher. Another point of interest is the difference in the vulnerability in 
relation to the key and initialization vector pair and insertion cycle. For the same key/IV pair and different 
clock cycles, different faults have been injected, changing them in relation to the key/IV used. 
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